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Summary findings
tIsing household survey data for 1998, Datt and  clharacteristics  aiffected  the impact of the shocks.
Hoogeveen assess the distributional impact of the recent  Ownership of land made households maore  susceptible to
economic crisis in the Philippines. The results suggest  the El Niflo shocks; higlher  levels of educaition made
that the impact of the crisis was modest, leading to a 5  househiolds  more vulnerable to wage and employment
percent reduction in average living standards and a 9  shocks.
percent increase in the incidence of poverty-with  larger  The inpact  of the crisis was greater in miore
increases indicated for the depth and severity of poverty.  commercially developed communities. Occupational
The greater shock came from El Ninio  rather  than  diversity within a household helped mitigate the adverse
through the labor market. The labor market shock was  imipact.
progressive (reducing inequality) while the El Nifio shock  Ther-e  is some1w  evidenice  of consumlption smoothing by
was regressive (increasinig  inequality).  the houselholds  affected bv the crisis, but the poor were
Not all households were equally vulnerable to the  less able to protect theil consumption, which is a matter
crisis-induced shocks. Household and community  of policy concern.
This paper-a  product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region-
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When devaluation of the Thai Baht in July 1997 marked the beginning  of the Asian
financial crisis, the Philippine economy was in relatively good shape. In the three years prior to
the crisis, the Philippines was not only enjoying favorable economic  growth, inflation  had
returned to manageable levels after the double digit rates of 1988-91,  the Peso was stable against
the US dollar, net international  reserves had grown  to comfortable levels, and the fiscal budget
was in surplus. Poverty rates had been declining;  for instance, the incidence of poverty declined
from 32% in 1994 to 25% in 1997 (Balisacan  1999, 2000).2
Nonetheless, the Thai financial crisis was rapidly transmitted  to the Philippine economy
and large capital outflows instantly created  downward  pressure on the Peso. The Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas (BPS) initially tried to defend  the Peso but as foreign reserves were insufficient  to
counter the massive capital outflows, the Peso depreciated from P26.40/$ in June 1997  to
P37.20/$ in December 1997 to a peak level of P42.66/$ in January 1998. To ease the pressure on
the exchange rate the government raised interest rates. In tandem with the depreciating  exchange
rate, interest rate on 91 day treasury bills rose from 10.5% in the first half of 1997 to a high of
19.1% in January 1998. Net domestic credit stopped growing and there was a sharp decline in
investment (by 17% during 1998).
With the setting in of the financial  crisis by the last quarter of 1997, the Philippine
economy stalled in 1998. Real GNP shrank  by 0.5% in 1998 (Table 1). Per capita  real GNP
declined by 2.7%. The financial crisis was compounded  by the worst drought in 30 years caused
2 The decline in the poverty headcount  was much less by official estimates, from 41% in 1994 to 37% in 1997,
though most of the difference  seems attributable  to the use of per capita income rather than per capita consumption
as the welfare indicator. See Balisacan 1999,  for further details.
1by the El-Ninio  beginning September 1997. This was reflected in the 1998 sectoral growth rates.
Agriculture contracted  the most, by 6.6%, while industrial production fell by 1.7%.
With the slowdown in output growth came the slowdown in employment. Unemployment
rates increased to double-digit  levels during 1998  (averaging 10.1% in 1998 against 8.7% in
1997). Inflation also accelerated to double-digit  levels. With the plummeting of agricultural
output, food prices increased even faster than the general level of prices (Figure 1). The crisis
also reduced government revenues, which constrained public spending despite an overall
counter-cyclical  fiscal policy adopted by the government. And real per capita spending on the
social services declined in 1998.
These macroeconomic  developments  raise a number of questions related to the potential
impact of the crisis on living standards of the Filipino population. In this paper, we address the
following four.
i) How large was the impact in terms of the effect on average living standards and
measures of absolute poverty?
ii) How was the impact distributed  across the population? What factors contributed  to
rendering some households more vulnerable  to the adverse shock than others?
iii) How did the impact on household consumption  compare with that on household
incomes? Is there any evidence of consumption  smoothing  by households?
iv) Was the Philippines  crisis more of an adverse weather phenomenon  than a financial
crisis? What was the relative contribution  of the El-Nifio  shock to the total impact?
In addressing  these questions,  this paper limits its focus to the consumption  or income
dimension of the welfare impact. The crisis of course potentially affected other dimensions  of
2welfare, however their analysis remains beyond the scope of this paper. 3 The paper is organized
as follows. The following section reviews what is known  about the impact of the crisis in the
Philippines. In the course of this review, we also make some methodological  comments on
related literature for other countries in the region. Sections 3 and 4 respectively describe  the data
and our methodology. Our results are presented in Section 5. The final section sums  up with
some concluding observations.
2.  What do we know about the distributional  impact of the crisis?
While it is generally  believed  that the Philippines  escaped  the worst of the regional
financial crisis 4, relatively little is known about the distributional  impact of the crisis (which for
the Philippines turned out to be a combination  of financial  and weather-related shocks). One
strand of work for other countries in the region  has involved comparisons  of distributional
parameters,  including measures  of absolute poverty,  based on household survey data before and
after (or during) the crisis. 5 For the Philippines,  the latest available household survey is the 1998
Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS)  conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6
Using these data in conjunction  with data from the 1997 Family Income and Expenditure  Survey
(FIES), Reyes, de Guzman, Manasan and Orbeta (1999) reported that per capita income declined
3 Some of the non-income  effects may of course be mediated  through changes in household incomes or
consumption. An assessment of the income or consumption  impact  thus has some relevance for the potential
magnitude of non-income  effects  too.
4 See for instance, World Bank (1999).
5  See, for instance, estimates in World Bank (2000). Some of this literature is also reviewed in Booth (1999). For
recent estimates  for Indonesia, see Suryahadi,  Sudarno, Suharso,  and Pritchett (1999).
6  A second round of the APIS for 1999  was also recently fielded by the NSO, though data from this survey  are not
yet available.
3by 3.6% in nominal tenns and 12.1% in real terms. 7 However, as Reyes et al. acknowledge,
even these before-after comparisons are problematic for the Philippines due to non-comparability
of the income and consumption modules across the two surveys (see below for details).  The
before-after comparisons also run into the problem of a misspecified counterfactual. Even for a
systemic shock, "before" estimates  may not be a good approximation of the estimates "in the
absence of a shock".
A different approach has been used for Thailand and Korea (Kakwani 1998, Kakwani and
Prescott 1999) where the counterfactual  level of an indicator of interest is constructed by
obtaining a predicted value from past trends of the indicator  up to the crisis. Thus, if y, is the
value of, say, the poverty indicator in the crisis period t, and y,  is its predicted value based on
past trends, then a crisis index for the poverty indicator is defined as ((y, /yt) - 1) and it measures
the percentage change in poverty due to the crisis. This approach, though unimplementable for
the Philippines for lack of comparable  post-crisis distributional data, is also methodologically
problematic on two counts. First, it is not clear over what period should one estimate trends
prior to the crisis, particularly so for a country such as the Philippines which has had a checkered
history of booms and busts (Lim 1998). In the end, the choice of the estimation period often
becomes an arbitrary expedient of data availability. Second, since the counterfactual is
constructed using unconditional trends, the approach attributes a 100% of the departure from
trend to the crisis, thus making no allowance  for changes in other non-crisis determinants of
living standards.
7There were some studies done before the APIS data became available in 1999. For instance, Reyes and Mandap
( 1999) used an existing CGE model to simulate  the likely impact of the crisis on incomes. They found that the crisis
would lead to a fall in average incomes of all deciles and an increase in the Gini ratio. No attempt was made to
separate the El Nifno  from the financial crisis effects, nor were there any simulated effects on consumption. There
were also studies undertaken by the World  Bank and UNDP, and by Lim (June 1998). These studies were done
shortly after the financial crisis and in the midst of the El Niflo drought, and had to rely on secondary data to explore
anticipated rather than actual effects.
4There is also work on panel data-based analysis of the impact of the crisis for Indonesia.
For instance, Beegle, Frankenberg and Thomas  (1999) estimate how changes in per capita
consumption and transitions into and out of poverty during 1997 and 1998 were related to a set
of household and community covariates  in 1997.  Such panel data analysis however also comes
with its own set of problems. First, a potential advantage  of panel data is that we can eliminate
potential bias due to any omitted observed or unobserved household level determinants  of
welfare, using household fixed or random effects. However, without an independent  measure of
the household-specific  shock, the presumption  is that everyone was hit by the crisis-induced
shock, and this rules out the use of "difference-in-differences"  estimation that has often been
used in impact evaluation analysis. 8 Second, while panel data holds the promise of providing a
direct measure of welfare change, there is also the thorny issue of measurement error. It is not
clear how much of the observed change in household welfare or transitions into or out of poverty
are signal rather than noise. Thus, even with panel data, empirical determination of the
distributional impact of the crisis is not easily resolved.
There have also been estimates of self-rated  poverty for the Philippines based on quarterly
surveys  conducted by the Social Weather Stations  (Mangahas 1999). According to these
surveys,  the incidence of poverty 9 averaged 59% for the period 1996-97  while the average for
1998  was 61%. Similarly, Reyes et al. (1999) reported an increase in self-rated poverty from
40% just before the crisis to 43% in January l999."0 Quite apart from the use of a very different
8  A useful discussion of the properties of this and other estimators commonly  used in the impact evaluation
literature  can be found in Angrist and Krueger  (1999).
9  The incidence of self-rated  poverty is not calculated  using a pre-determined  poverty line but by asking households
where would they place their family on a card marked  with the words "poor" and "nonpoor" and a line in between.
See Mangahas (1999) for further details.
'°  This is however based on a much smaller survey of 430 households in 31 communities. The sample households
were selected on the basis of spatial and sectoral  categories  using purposive rather than a probability sampling
(Reyes et al. 1999).
5concept of poverty, for reasons analogous to those mentioned above, it is unclear how of much of
this increase could be attributed to the crisis.
As for work on the relative weights of the El Nino and financial components in the overall
impact of the crisis, this has remained limited to the suggestion that the El Nifno  phenomenon
may have had a greater impact than the financial crisis, based on sectoral employment and output
information (Ponciano et al. 1998). Such a general statement could also be surmised from the
sectoral growth rates presented in Table 1, which show a greater slump in the agricultural sector.
However, this is no more than a conjecture since it can hardly be presumed that El Niuo's effects
were confined to the agricultural sector. Nor can it be presumed that the financial crisis affected
only the non-agricultural  economy. In addition, the distributional  impact within each sector
could also be quite diverse, which makes it difficult to assess the poverty impact of the two
shocks from their contribution to the impact on sectoral output or employment levels.
3.  Data
3.1. 1998 APIS survey: an opportunity?
The 1998  APIS survey was designed to be a longitudinal survey forming a panel with the
1997 FIES.  23,150 households (59.8% of the APIS sample) were thus common to both surveys.
While these data could in principle provide us with a direct measure of welfare change, the
potential usefulness of the longitudinal nature of these data was seriously impaired by problems
of comparability of income and consumption across the two surveys. The comparability of
income was impaired because the reference period used in the APIS is limited to a six-month
period (from April to September 1998), while the FIES incomes relate to the full calendar year
(January to December 1997).  A partial-year recall of incomes introduces unknown seasonal
6biases in the estimates of incomes,  and has particularly serious implications for estimates  of
agricultural incomes and incomes from other self-employment  which are best defined in annual
terms. The comparability  of consumption, on the other hand, was compromised by the use of a
much shorter consumption  module in the APIS.  1  "  The APIS uses a two-page module identifying
only major categories  of consumption  while a detailed forty-page  consumption module is used in
the FIES with a detailed coverage of items within categories. A shorter consumption  module
generally  introduces a downward  bias in measured  consumption levels (see, Jolliffe, 1999, for
instance). Thus, ex post it is virtually impossible  to separate out how much of any observed
decline in consumption  would be attributable  to a real crisis-related  welfare shock versus how
much is simply on account of measurement  error related  to the use of a shorter module.
3.2. Direct self-reported  measures of shock
In view of this problem, we explored other ways of ascertaining  welfare impact of the crisis.
Fortunately, a separate section of the APIS survey also included some direct questions on the
crisis, where households were asked if they were adversely affected  by the crisis in different
ways. In particular,  five potential shocks were identified. Households  were asked: "During the
past six months, did the following  problems affect you and your family?"
i) increasing prices of food and other basic commodities,
ii) loss of job within the country,
iii) loss of job due to retrenchment of migrant/overseas  workers of the family,
iv) reduced wages,
v) drought or "El Ninio".
"There is some limited abbreviation  of the income module too in the APIS, but for the most part, the income
modules of FIES and APIS are comparable.
7It is however not clear what is meant by being "affected by a problem". The allusion to being
affected by a "problem" rather than just an "event" is indicative of the intent to elicit responses
on potentially adverse impact. But all we have from the survey are yes/no responses from
households; we have no measure of the intensity of the effect of any one of these shocks.
The relative frequency of different shocks  is indicated in Table 2.  Two key points are
notable about the figures in Table 2.
First, virtually everyone  - nine out of every ten persons - reported being affected by the
price shock. However, a large share of the population was also hit by other shocks. For
instance, about two-thirds of the population reported being hit by at least one of the other four
shocks.
Second, most households reported being affected by more than one shock. For instance,
less than 30% of the population was reportedly affected by only a single shock. If one were to
disregard the price shock, which was experienced  by virtually everyone, less than 3% of the
population reported being affected by a single shock only. The multiplicity of shocks reported
by the households reflects both the multidimensional  nature of the crisis as well as multiple
sources of income within the household.
3.3. Alternative specifications of the shock variable
The universal nature of the price shock makes the identification  of its impact virtually
impossible using a single cross-sectional  data. The size of the sub-sample  not affected by the
price shock is far too small to construct a credible control group. On the other hand, the shock
due to loss of migrant or overseas  job is experienced  by relatively few households accounting for
less than 5% of the population.  We thus decided to focus on two main categories  of shocks for
our analysis: the labor market shock applying to households who experienced  either reduced
8wages or a loss ofjob within the country or overseas (this combines shocks ii, iii and iv above);
and the drought or El-Nino shock (shock v above). Further, given that some households
experienced both types of shocks, we eventually identified three mutually exclusive categories of
shocks, viz., (1) labor market shock alone, (2) El-Nifno  shock alone, and (3) joint labor market
and El-Nifio  shock. Using these definitions, we find that about 9% of the population (8% of
sample) was affected by the labor market shock, about 40% (39% of sample) by the El-Nifio
shock, and about 19% (18% of sample) was affected by both. Altogether, the three shocks
account for more than two-thirds of the Filipino population (Table 2). In the following, we
attempt to identify separate effects of these three shocks on household living standards.
4.  Methodology
Our basic model for assessing  the impact of the crisis is straightforward. Household living
standards, measured by their per capita consumption, are determined by a number of household
attributes and the attributes of the communities  they live in.  They are also determined  by their
exposure to crisis-related economic shocks, leading to the following characterization:
(1)  InC;=  /,'XJ  + y'LSL  +y 2 SE  +  YLEsLE  +
where Cj is the average consumption per person in householdj, Xj is a set of household
characteristics and other determinants of householdj's  per capita consumption, S°  are binary
variables indicating if the household experienced crisis-related shocks, and e, is a random
disturbance term.  As discussed above (section 3), three measures of shock are distinguished:  the
labor market shock (SL), the El-Nifio  shock (SE), and both (SEE).
Consumption per capita is adjusted for spatial cost of living differentials and is expressed
in 1998 Manila prices using spatial price indices estimated by Balisacan (1999). The vector Xj
9controls for a large number of potential determinants  of household consumption that are briefly
described below.
i)  Household demographics: This includes linear and quadratic terms in family size, and
household composition variables including number  of adult (ages 15-60)  male and female
members, number of children below 7 years of age, and number of children in the age
group 7-15.
ii)  Characteristics  of household head: This includes indicator  variables for female  headship
and marital status (being single, divorced or widowed), as well as linear and quadratic
terms in age of the household head.
iii)  Education: This includes average completed  years of schooling of adult household
members and a quadratic term in the same. We experimented with separating out male
and female average years of schooling  and also using dummy variables for each
successive  year of schooling. This did not significantly  improve upon the simple
quadratic specification in average years of schooling,  and hence we decided to stick to
that specification  in the interest of limiting the number of interaction terms with the shock
variables in an augmented model discussed later.
iv)  Occupational  characteristics:  Occupational  background  of household members is
represented by a set of binary variables for different occupational sectors they were
employed in. The binary variables take a value of unity if there is at least one household
member working in a given sector, zero otherwise.  2 Ten sectors are distinguished:
agriculture, fishery and forestry;  mining and quarrying; manufacturing;  electricity, gas
12  We  prefer  this  to a specification  in  terms  of the number  of members  in  each  occupational  category  because  the
latter  is more  likely  to be responsive  to a shock  than  the affiliation  of at least  one  member  to an occupational
category.  All  occupational  variables  relate  to a household  member's  primary  job or business  during  the first  three
months  of the survey,  i.e.  April-June  1998.
10and water; construction; in wholesale or retail trade; transport, storage, communication;
finance, real estate, business services; community,  social, and personal services; and
other occupations. A variable representing  employment diversity within the household is
also included;  this is defined as the number of distinct occupational sectors in which the
household members were employed. We later examine the extent to which such diversity
works as a risk-management  strategy. We also include a dummy  variable for households
who report producing  any food for self-consumption.
v)  Land, electricity, social network,  public assistance: We include binary variables for
household's ownership  of land (data on the amount of land owned are not available), and
its use of electricity which is included as a proxy for other income-generating
endowments  of the household. We also include a binary variable indicating household
membership of cooperatives  or NGOs; this mimics social capital variables that have
sometimes been suggested to be important  both as a determinant of household living
standards as well as a mechanism to insure against bad times.'3 We also include an
indicator variable for households who were recipients of assistance from the government,
including  receiving a scholarship or agricultural  extension services,  or being a beneficiary
of the housing or the land reform program.
vi)  Community  or barangay characterislics: Here, we include three indices based on
barangay  or community-level  data: one for infrastructure  capital, one for community
social capital, and one for commercial  capital. The infrastructure  capital index is
constructed as an average of binary variables indicating the presence in the barangay of a
phone, a telegraph,  postal services, a laid-out street pattern and access to national roads.
1  Following  Putnam's (1993) influential  study, there has been a large literature that has sought to tie both
individual  and community-oriented  notions of social capital to economic  success in various forms.
11The community social capital index is constructed as an average of binary variables
pertaining to the presence of a town hall, a community hall, a church, or a park in the
barangay. The commercial  capital index is constructed by adding barangay-level
variables on the number of financial institutions, industrial establishments  and stores and
dividing by 30 (the highest number  attained' 4).
Summary statistics on the model variables can be found in Annex Table 1.
In order to capture any omitted (observable  as well as unobservable)  provincial/sectoral
level determinants of consumption,  we also allow for strata fixed effects where 168 strata are
identified by the rural and urban sectors of individual provinces.
In the simple construct of model (1), the y-parameters  yield measures of the impact of the
crisis on household living standards. For instance, an estimated value of -0.05 for  J implies that
the exposure to labor market shock alone reduces per capita consumption by 5%. However,
model (1) also carries the implication  that a given shock has the same proportional impact on
consumption for all households affected  by that shock. This seems an overly strong assumption.
Presumably,  a shock may hit some households  more severely than others, and similarly, some
households may be better able to protect their living standards than others when hit by a
particular shock. For instance, the impact  of a wage shock may depend on the education level of
the workers and the effect of drought may depend on the ownership of land. In general, the
impact of the shock would be expected  to be a function of the characteristics  and circumstances
faced by the household. This consideration  leads us to an augmented  version of model (1) where
we interact shock variables with a set of household and community characteristics  (Zj):
14 For each of these three indicators,  the APIS questionnaire  records the actual number if less than 10,  and records
10 if there are 10 or more of them in the barangay.
12(2)  InC  8,X  rLSL+YESE+yl.ES1F  +L,Z  SL  +  ,E,  +L  ZSL  +U
The interaction terms could also be interpreted as indicative of how the returns to specific
characteristics  are altered by the shocks related to the crisis.'5 The vector of interacted
characteristics, Zj, could be the same as the set of determinants of consumption, Xj. However, in
the interest of maintaining a more parsimonious  specification, we limit Zj to a subset of Aj1 .6 In
particular, we allow the effects of shocks to depend on the households' endowments of labor,
land and human capital; we thus include the number of adult male and female members,  the
average years of education of adult members, and the ownership of land. We also allow the
shocks to depend on households' social network and employment diversity, as measures of their
risk-management  abilities.  And finally, we allow the shocks to depend on the community-level
indices of infrastructure, social and commercial  capital. Thus, each one of the three shocks was
interacted with this set of nine variables.
In estimating models (1) and (2), we treat the crisis-related shocks as exogenous to
households' current living standards. This seems a reasonable assumption. The financial or
weather-related  shock was much in the nature offait  accompli at the household level, and thus
arguably exogenous to household living standards. One could however argue that there is
endogeneity due to the self-reported shocks being measured with error. We later comment on
our attempts to relax this assumption.
15 The introduction  of several interaction  terms also makes for a flexible functional form which brings this approach
closer to matching techniques often used in impact evaluation  studies, where a control group is generated
conditional on observable characteristics (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1998).
16  We did experiment with interacting the shock variables with full set of variables in the X vector. However, this
generated a very large number of highly insignificant interaction  terms, which tended to make the model predictions
conditional on the absence of the shocks quite imprecise. Even as an encompassing model, the full-interaction
model permitted several data-consistent restricted forms, which made this an unpromising specification  search
135.  Results
The estimated models are shown in the first panel of Table 3.  In general, the models fit the
data well and explain between 56-58% of the variation in log consumption. The signs and
magnitudes of most of the estimated parameters for the determinants of household living
standards are reasonable. The estimated parameters for these determinants also appear to be
quite robust across the different specifications  presented in Table 3.
As for the effects of crisis-induced shocks, the ordinary least squares estimates of model
(1) indicate that the labor market shock had a 12% negative impact on per capita consumption of
households affected by that shock alone, the El-Nifio  shock reduced the consumption of those
affected by 5%, while households who were affected by both shocks suffered a negative impact
on their consumption of the order of 9%.  The smaller effect of the joint shock relative to the
single labor market shock may appear strange, but it is entirely consistent with the possibility
that those hit by the single labor market shock were hit harder than those affected by both
shocks. As mentioned before, model (1) is quite restrictive in imposing a constant proportionate
impact for all households affected by a given shock. Even if this gives a reasonable estimate of
the average impact, this specification is clearly unsuitable for exploring how the impact of the
crisis was differentiated  across the population, and hence would also be unsuitable for examining
the impact on poverty and other distributional indicators.
The estimates of model (2) relax this restrictive assumption by interacting each of the three
shock variables with a number of household and community attributes (as discussed above in
section 4).  Table 3 presents two sets of estimates for model (2).  The second set of estimates is
obtained by pruning the model down to eliminate highly insignificant interaction terms after
statistically testing for their joint significance (see F-test reported at the bottom of Table 3). The
strategy.  At the expense of being somewhat  ad hoc, we instead opted for an a priori specification of interaction
14estimates of the pruned model are more efficient and we use them for assessing the distributional
impact of the crisis.
5.1. What made  for  lesser or greater impact?
The estimates of interaction terms in model (2) suggest some interesting patterns of how
household and community attributes influenced the impact of crisis-related shocks on household
living standards.
Labor market shock.  The highly significant negative parameter on average years of
education shows that the labor market shock significantly reduces the returns to education. The
impact on consumption is greater at higher levels of education. The negative parameters on the
adult male and female members, though not significant, are also interpretable as reducing the
returns to household labor endowments. The coefficient on employment diversity is not
significant, but its positive sign points to a mitigating effect on the impact of the shock.
However, the adverse impact of the labor market shock increases significantly with the
community's level of commercial development. This is quite plausible since the more
commercially-developed  communities, by virtue of their superior integration with the rest of the
economy, are also likely to be more exposed to shocks associated with macroeconomic and
financial crises. It is also notable that the ownership of land is not a significant factor
influencing the impact of the labor market shock.
El-Nifio shock.  Not surprisingly, the adverse impact of this shock increases significantly
with the ownership of land. The household's educational endowment on the other hand does not
seem to have a bearing on the impact of this weather-related shock. The significant negative
coefficient on the household social network indicates that the El-Nifio shock significantly eroded
the beneficial effects of such networks, rather than these networks being able to protect
terms that appeared reasonable in behavioral termns.  15household living standards (possibly reflecting the covariate nature of the shock). A similar
effect is also observed for community social capital.  However, a greater degree of employment
diversity within the household does protect its living standards against the El-Niiio shock.
Joint labor market and El-Nifio shock.  As may be expected, the results for the joint
occurrence of both shocks are somewhere  in-between those of the individual shocks. The
adverse impact of the joint shock increases with the level of education, the ownership of land,
and the level of community's commercial development. It decreases with the diversity of
employment within the household.
5.2.  Impact on poverty and inequality
The estimates of model (2) are used to derive the impact of the shocks and hence the
counterfactual consumption of households in the absence of the crisis.  For households who were
not affected by any of the three shocks, the impact of the shocks is by definition zero and their
counterfactual  consumption is the same as their actual consumption. For those affected, the
shocks' impact is measured as the difference between predicted consumption conditional on not
being affected by the shocks and the unconditional predicted consumption. The pre-crisis or
counterfactual consumption (Cj*)  is thus derived as actual consumption (Cj) minus the impact of
the shocks. Thus,
(3)  C;=C,  - [exp(  ln  C' S5  -=  O)  - exp(ln  C,)]
where the term in the square bracket measures the impact of the crisis-related shocks. Strictly
speaking, the impact is measured as the maximum of the estimate in the square brackets and
zero. There is no guarantee that the estimated parameters of the model would yield a negative
impact on consumption for all households  reportedly affected by the crisis. In general, we found
that a larger number of interaction terms in the model tended to generate a larger number of
16cases of positive impact. And this turned out be an important reason for using estimates based
on the pruned interaction model (which is also related to the pruned model being more
efficient).  1 7 Using the pruned model estimates in Table 3, the impact turned out to be positive
for 1  115 (or 4.4%) of the 25,079 households affected  by the three shocks. The impact for these
households was set to zero.'8
A brief comment on the issue of measurement  error is pertinent here. It is arguable that the
self-reported shocks are measured with error, which makes the shock variables endogenous in
models (1) and (2).  A potential solution is the use of instrumental variable (IV) estimation. In
particular, we constructed instrumental variables as cluster means of the shock variables leaving
out the current household.  These are plausible instruments insofar as a household is more likely
to report a shock if many others in the neighborhood are also reporting that shock, but others
being affected by the shock should not affect this household's living standard except through the
household's self-reported shock. We thus estimated the consumption models using these
instrumental variables. The IV estimates of model (I) are shown in Table 3. The estimated
parameters for variables other than the shock variables turned out to be very close to the ordinary
least squares estimates. For the shock variables there were some notable differences. While the
IV and OLS estimates for the El-Nino shock parameter were very similar (-0.05 and -0.06
respectively), the IV estimates of the impact of the labor market and the joint El Nino-labor
market shocks were much lower in absolute terms (in fact not significantly different to zero).
Rather than an attenuation bias expected in case of a simple random measurement  error, the
''  This  was  also  a consideration  in  estimating  a single  model  for rural  and  urban  sectors. Our experiments  with
estimating  separate  models  for  rural and  urban  sectors,  which  effectively  doubled  the number  of interaction  terms
ran into  the same  problem  of inefficient  estimates  with  a large  number  of cases  of positive  impact.  We do however
allow  for sectoral  effects  on consumption  through  the strata  fixed  effects,  as discussed  above.
'a This  makes  negligible  difference  to the results. For instance,  not setting  these  positive  impacts  to zero  lowers  the
mean  impact  on consumption  by P16  per person  per  year,  from  P1387  to P1361,  both  amounting  to virtually  the
same  proportion  of counterfactual  consumption,  i.e.  4.9%.
17results suggest the opposite if anything. We may thus be dealing with a more complex pattern of
endogeneity in self-reported shocks.
However,  the IV estimates of model (2) with interaction  terms did not appear credible on
two counts. First, some of the marginal  effects turned out to be too large. For instance, the
marginal effect of commercial development  on the impact of the labor market shock was a
negative 61%. Larger marginal effects are of course consistent  with measurement error, but the
IV effects appeared too large to be credible. Secondly,  the IV estimates also generated a large
number of cases with a positive impact of the crisis on living standards, accounting for as much
as 25% of all crisis-affected  households,  which again appeared highly implausible. (We interpret
a large number of positive impacts ultimately  as a sign of model misspecification.) For these
reasons, we decided not to use the IV estimates  at the risk of some potential bias due to
measurement  error.  If the IV estimates  of model (I) are any guide, there may be some upward
bias in our estimated impact.
We thus use counterfactual  consumption  based on ordinary least squares estimates of the
(restricted) interaction model (2) to assess the impact on poverty and inequality. We use the
FGT class of poverty measures and a number of inequality measures including Theil's T index
and the generalized entropy measures (see Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984, and Cowell,
1995). For the poverty measures, we use the provincial  poverty lines developed by Balisacan
(1999).  19 Table 4 sumnmarizes  the key results.
The results indicate a modest impact of the crisis. There is a negative effect on mean
consumption of about 5%. This may be compared with the 2% decline in real per capita GNP,
19 In effect, we use the Manila poverty line  of Pl 1,677  per person per year corresponding to a nutritional  norm of
2000 calories per person  per day and allowing for basic nonfood expenditure (see Balisacan 1999 for further
details). The provincial  poverty lines have in fact already been used above to express nominal consumption  of all
households into 1998  Manila prices.
18but a 2% increase in per capita  personal consumption,  between 1997 and 1998 estimated from
the national accounts (NSCB, 1999). The impact  on the headcount index is of the order of about
9% (an increase from 29.1% to 3  1.7%), while the poverty gap index is about 11% higher due to
the crisis, and similarly, the squared poverty gap index is indicated  to be about 13% higher. The
effects on living standards and poverty are of course larger for the crisis-affected  population.
The measured magnitude  of the impact of the crisis on poverty of course also depends on
the poverty line. To examine this, we plot in Figure 2 how  the entire cumulative distribution
function (CDF) shifted as a result of the crisis. The Figure plots the difference between the actual
("post-crisis") and counterfactual  ("pre-crisis")  CDFs against log per capita consumption. Thus,
for instance, at the poverty line, we can read off a value of 2.6, which confirms  the result in
Table 4 that the crisis induced an increase in the headcount index by 2.6% points. But the key
point that Figure 2 shows is that the impact of the crisis could have been significantly  higher or
lower depending upon where the poverty line is drawn. This comes out even more strongly in
Figure 3 where we plot the ratio of the actual-to-counterfactual  distribution functions. Again,
while at the poverty line we have used, the crisis appears  to induce about a 9% increase in the
headcount index (as noted above),  the percentage impact  could be much higher for lower
poverty lines (up to 16% if the poverty line were halved), and much lower for higher poverty
lines (falling down to 3% if the poverty line were doubled).
The crisis appears to have had little effect on measures  of overall inequality (Table 4).
With the exception  of the third-degree generalized  entropy measure, the impact ranges between
less than 1% and 2.5%.
We also looked at whether  the shock was progressive, i.e. whether the absolute impact as a
proportion of pre-crisis (counterfactual)  consumption was an increasing function of pre-crisis
1920
consumption.  We find that the total (absolute) impact is progressive (inequality reducing), i.e.
proportionate impact is positively related to pre-crisis consumption. However, this masks the
contrasting effects of the labor market and El-Nino shocks. The former is progressive
(proportionate  impact increasing in pre-crisis consumption),  while the latter is regressive
(proportionate  impact declining in pre-crisis  consumption). This is consistent with the notion
that the labor market shock affected the relatively better-off wage earners  more severely, while
the impact of the impact of the drought was heavier on the relatively poorer agriculture-based
households. The impact of the joint labor market-El  Nifio shock is found to be neither
progressive nor regressive.
Finally, does the introduction  of interaction  terms into the model make an appreciable
difference  to the estimated impact? The results on this, though mixed, do not suggest a large
discrepancy. Using model (1) the impact on mean consumption  is estimated at 4% relative to
5% with the interaction model, while the effects on the incidence,  depth and severity of poverty
are estimated at 10, 13 and 16% respectively  relative to 9, 11 and 13% with the interaction
model. The small magnitude of the discrepancy is probably due to two factors. First, the crisis-
affected  households are the same across the two methodologies  and hence their place in the
overall distribution is also the same across the two methodologies. Second, while the
methodologies  do differ in their determination  of marginal impacts for affected households, the
magnitude of these marginal impacts is relatively small. Thus, in the end even when marginal
effects are allowed to vary by household characteristics,  it makes little difference  to the overall
impact. These results may however be somewhat  peculiar to our data set, and in general we
would caution against a model imposing  uniform impact across households.
20  This  is done by running  a simple  (tobit)  regression  of the absolute  shock  as proportion  of pre-crisis  consumption
on log of pre-crisis  consumption.
205.3. El-Nino or El-Peso?
We also looked into relative contributions  of the three shocks to the total impact on mean
consumption and poverty. This is also shown in Table 4. The labor market shock alone
accounted for about a quarter of the total impact on mean consumption, the El-Nifio shock alone
contributed 38% and remaining 36% was attributable  to the joint labor market-El Nifio shock.
We are unable to decompose  the last component for the joint shock any further, and thus the
shares for the individual shocks can be interpreted  as lower bounds for the labor market and El
Nifio shocks. Hence, by these estimates,  the contribution  of the labor market shock was
somewhere  between 26-62% while that of El Ninio  was somewhere  between 38-74%.
The contribution of the El-Nino shock to the total impact is higher for the poverty
measures. For instance, this shock alone contributed  about 46% to the increase in the headcount
index. For the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap measures, more than half the impact is
on account of the El-Nifio  shock alone, while the labor market shock alone contributed  only
about 10-11%. About one-third of the total impact  is attributable  to the joint El Nifio-labor
market shock. If one were to split this joint shock in proportion  with the shares of the individual
shocks, the contribution  of the El-Nifto  shock to the depth and severity of poverty would be
upwards  of 80%.
5.4. Income vs. consumption impact
The analysis of crisis impact presented  thus far has been in terms of household
consumption. The APIS also collected data on household incomes which offers us an
opportunity to compare income and consumption impacts. In particular, a smaller consumption
shock (in absolute terms) would be consistent  with the idea of consumption smoothing,  i.e.,
households at least partially protecting  their consumption  against income shocks  through such
21means as dissaving, borrowing or sale of assets. We thus re-estimated models (1) and (2) with
log income per capita as the dependent variable. The results are shown in the second panel of
Table 3.
There are notable points of similarity  between the income and consumption models. With
few exceptions, the parameter estimates for the non-shock variables in the income models are
highly comparable with the corresponding  estimates  in the consumption  models. Similarly,  the
IV estimates of model (1)21 display a pattern analogous  to that observed for the consumption
model, indicating comparable  impact for the El Nifno  shock, but significantly smaller impacts for
the labor market and the joint labor market-El  Niio shocks relative to the ordinary least squares
estimates. While these similarities are important,  of greater interest are the points of difference
between the income and consumption models,  to which we turn below.
The estimates of model (1) without the interaction  terms indicate proportionate income
impacts for affected households that are larger (in absolute  terms) than the corresponding
consumption impacts: 17, 8 and 15% as against 11, 5 and 9% for the labor market, El Nifio, and
the joint labor market-El-Nifo shocks respectively. Does this finding of a larger income impact
carry over to the more general model (2) specification  with interactions?
The estimates for the interaction model after pruning highly insignificant interaction terms
are also shown in Table 3.  While the estimates  for a number of interaction terms are similar
across income and consumption  models, there are some differences, suggesting that income and
consumption vulnerability  are affected somewhat  differently  by household/community  attributes.
For instance, while the El Nifno  shock significantly  reduced the positive effect of membership of
a co-operative or NGO on consumption,  it had no such effect on income. On the other hand, co-
2'  Estimated using the same instruments  as in the consumption  model, viz., "left-out" cluster means of the shock
variables.
22operative/NGO  membership seems to reduce the income impact of the  joint labor market-El
Ninio  shock, but does not have this effect on consumption. Do these differences translate into a
significant  difference in the overall effect on mean incomes  and income-based  poverty and
inequality measures (relative to mean consumption and consumption-based  poverty measures)?
Table 5 suggests only small differences. The effect on mean income is of the order of -7%
compared with -5% for mean consumption. The impact  on income poverty is correspondingly
larger: an increase of 12, 16 and 18% in income-based  H, PG and SPG measures, as against a 9,
11 and 13% increase in corresponding  consumption-based  measures. 22 Incidentally,  the El Nifio
shock still accounts for the bulk of the total impact on average incomes as well as income
poverty (Table 5).
The relatively modest difference  in the impacts on income and consumption-based
measures of living standards and poverty,  which are averages for the population as a whole
(including those not affected by the shocks), may nonetheless  hide some consumption smoothing
by those affected by the shock. To examine this, we directly compare the income and
consumption impacts for affected  households. This is done in Figure 4, which plots the
consumption impact as a proportion  of counterfactual  income against the income impact also
expressed as a proportion of counterfactual  income. It turns out that for nearly three-fourths of
the affected households, the estimated consumption  impact is smaller than the estimated income
impact. The graph in Figure 4 also shows a non-parametric  regression line of the consumption
impact on the income impact, which lies below the 450 line, implying smaller consumption
impacts. For the affected households,  the mean consumption impact  turns out to be 73% of the
mean income impact. However,  the median ratio of consumption  to income shock amongst  the
22 Note that for the income-based  poverty measures,  the poverty line is calibrated to yield the same headcount index
as obtained with per capita consumption  as the measure of welfare.
23affected  population was 64%. The evidence  thus suggests that despite the relatively limited
magnitude  of the shock, the affected  households  did resort to actions aimed at smoothing their
consumption.
Did the poor resort to greater or lesser consumption smoothing  than the non-poor? The
median consumption  to income shock ratio for the income-poor  and nonpoor (using
counterfactual  income per capita as the welfare measure) were 67% and 63% respectively.
However, the mean ratios (with a 2% trim of the tails at each end) for these groups were 94%
and 78% respectively; while the overall mean consumption/income  shock ratio (with the 2%
trim) was 83%. The results thus point to the more limited ability of the poor to maintain their
consumption in the face of crisis-induced  income shocks.
6.  Conclusion
The following key findings emerge from our analysis of the distributional  effects of the
economic crisis in the Philippines. The impact of the crisis was modest relative to what has been
estimated for other crisis-affected  countries  in the region. By our estimates, the crisis caused a
5% reduction in average living standards. It led to an increase in the incidence of poverty by
about 9%, and in the depth and severity of poverty by 11% and 13% respectively. And the
impact on measures of overall inequality was minimal. However, in assessing the estimated
effects on poverty, it is important to bear in mind that our results could underestimate  the full
impact of the crisis to the extent they do not factor in the effects of the price shock reported by
nearly 90% of the population. On the other hand, there may also be an element of
overestimation of the impact on account of potential measurement  error in the self-reported
shocks.
24Our results also suggest that in terms of the poverty impact  the crisis in the Philippines was
more of an El-Nifio  phenomenon  than a financial  crisis. We find that the largest share of the
overall impact on poverty is attributable  to the El-Nifno  shock,  its share ranging between 47-57%
of the total impact on measures of incidence,  depth and severity  of poverty. Another one-third of
the total impact is attributable  to the  joint effects  of the El-Nifio  and labor market shock, while
the labor market shock by itself only accounts  for 10-17%  of the total poverty impact. Given
that El-Nifio  is a recurrent phenomenon  in the Philippines  occurring every 3-4 years, our findings
have relevance beyond the most recent crisis.
We find that the estimated impact on poverty  is sensitive  to the choice of the poverty lines.
The proportional  impact on poverty incidence,  for instance, declines over a wide range of
poverty lines,  which also suggests greater proportionate  impact on measures  of ultra poverty.
We also find that while the labor market shock  was progressive  (inequality reducing),  the El
Nino shock was regressive (inequality increasing).
Not all households were equally vulnerable  to the crisis-induced shocks. We find that
while ownership of land made households  more susceptible  to the El-Nifio  shock (which is
unsurprising),  higher levels of education  made them more vulnerable  to wage and employment
shocks. The impact of the crisis also increased  with the level of commercial development  of the
community. The crisis also dampened the positive effects on living standards of households'
social network (such things as membership of co-operatives  and NGOs) and community  social
capital (such things as a town hall, a church, a park or library in the community). However,  we
also find evidence  that occupational  diversity within  the household helped mitigate the adverse
impact of crisis-related shocks.
Our results also suggest that despite the relatively small magnitude  of the overall impact of
the crisis, households did try to protect their consumption. For three-fourths of the affected
25households, consumption  impacts were smaller in magnitude  than the income impacts;  the
median consumption impact  was about one-third  lower, while the mean consumption  impact was
about four-fifths of the income impact. This points to a limited ability of households to smooth
consumption  in face of income shocks, which is a matter of policy concern. Of even greater
concern is the evidence  that the ability of the poor to protect their consumption  was more limited
than that of the nonpoor.
26Table 1: Macro-economic indicators, by quarter: 1997-1998
1997  1998
QJ  Q2  Q3  Q4  Average  Ql  Q2  Q3  Q4  Average
Output growth (% per
year):
Agriculture  4.9  1.8  0.4  4.1  2.9  -3.6  -11.5  0.0  -1.2  -6.6
Industry  5.1  7.6  6.4  5.6  6.1  1.3  -1.5  -0.7  -1.9  -1.7
Services  6.1  5.7  5.6  4.6  5.5  4.9  3.6  -3.1  -7.8  3.5
Gross Domestic Product  5.5  5.6  4.9  4.8  5.2  1.6  -0.8  -0.7  -1.9  0.1
Gross National Product  5.4  5.3  5.2  5.3  5.3  2.0  -0.3  0.0  -1.2  -0.5
Unemploymentrate(%)  7.7  10.4  8.7  7.9  8.7  8.4  13.3  8.9  9.6  10.1
Inflation (% per year)  4.7  4.5  4.9  5.8  5.0  7.0  9.6  10.5  10.6  9.4
Exchange rate (Peso/$)  26.3  26.4  29.8  35.4  29.5  40.7  39.4  42.9  40.6  40.9
Net foreign reserves
(million $)  10268  10065  8261  7456  9013  6990  8418  7970  8004  7845
Note: The figures for inflation, exchange rate and net foreign reserves are quarterly mean calculated  from of
monthly data.
Source:  National Statistical Coordination Board and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
Table 2: The incidence of crisis-related  economic shocks
Crisis-related shocks  Percent of sample  Percent of population
households affected  affected
Price shock  89.9  91.4
Domestic employment shock  18.4  20.3
Overseas/migrant  employment shock  4.32  4.93
Wage shock  15.5  16.7
DroughtlEl-Nifto  shock  56.6  59.8
Price shock only  28.2  26.0
Domestic employment shock only  0.16  0.16
Overseas/migrant  employment shock only  0.02  0.02
Wage shock only  0.23  0.19
Drought/El Niflo shock only  2.36  2.28
Hit by at least one of the five shocks  93.0  94.4
Hit by at least one of the four shocks other than  64.8  68.4
the price shock
Labor market shock (regardless of the price  8.1  8.6
shock)
El-Niflo shock (regardless of the price shock)  39.0  40.4
Both El-Niflo  and labor market shocks (regardless  17.6  19.4
of price shock)
Source: Calculated  from 1998 APIS data.
27Table 3: The estimated consumption  and income models (1998 APIS)
Dep.  variable:  Log  consumption  per person  Dep.  variable:  Log income  per person
Model  (1)  Model  (1)  Model  (2)  Model  (2)  Model  (1)  Model  (1)  Model  (2)
OLS  IV  OLS  restricted  OLS  IV  restricted
Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat
At  least  one adult household  member
-in agriculture,  fishery or forestry  -0.1113  -6.73  -0.1088  -6.43  -0.1115  -6.75  -0.1111  -6.71  -0.0041  -0.20  -0.0005  -0 02  -0.0035  -0.18
-in  mining or quarrying  0.0607  1.45  0.0573  1.38  0.0544  1.30  0.0558  1.33  0.2480  5.01  0.2446  4.98  0.2469  4.96
-inmanufacturing  -0.0170  -1.00  -0.0214  -1.26  -0.0164  -0.96  -0.0150  -0.88  0.2195  10.76  0.2151  10.50  0.2226  10.92
-in electricity, gas  or water  0.1769  5.59  0.1768  5.54  0.1755  5.57  0.1765  5.59  0.4380  13.13  0.4370  13.06  0.4406  13.27
-in construction  -0.0991  -5.B5  -0.1083  -6.34  -0.1007  -5.96  -0.0994  -5.87  0.1737  8.39  0.1652  7.92  0.1739  8.41
-inwholesaleorretail  0.0144  0.87  0.0128  0.77  0.0146  0.88  0.0155  0.94  0.2214  11.14  0.2199  11.04  0.2234  11.23
-in transport,  storage,  communication  -0.0348  -2.06  -0.0375  -2.22  -0.0345  -2.04  -0.0336  -1.99  0.1889  9.20  0.1863  9.07  0.1915  9.33
-in finance,  realestate,  business  services  0.1301  5.80  0.1313  5.82  0.1295  5.78  0.1306  5.82  0.3607  14.08  0.3615  14.07  0.3626  14.15
- in communal, social,  personal  services  0.0384  2.35  0.0370  2.26  0.0363  2.22  0.0375  2.29  0.3214  16.14  0.3196  16.00  0.3212  16.12
l'roduces  tood for own consutnption  -0.1181  -10.97  -0.1194  -11.01  -0.1179  -10.96  -0.1177  -10.98  -0.1203  -10.48  -0.1203  -10.44  -0.1202  -10.49
Urban  household  0.0686  1.05  0.0752  1.19  0.0695  1.07  0.0702  1.08  0.0587  0.92  0.0640  1 04  0.0634  1.00
Member ofa cooperative  orNGO  0.2584  18.97  0.2566  18.84  0.3125  13.40  0.2945  17.30  0.2203  14.86  0.2195  14.82  0.2030  12.39
Beneficiaryofgovernmentassistance(extension  0.2162  4.86  0.2143  4.82  0.2249  5.06  0.2249  5.06  0.1230  2.54  0.1216  2.50  0.1251  2.59
service/scholarship/housing/land  reform)
Ownsland  0.1428  13.24  0.1476  13.60  0.1716  8.15  0.1738  9.06  0.0870  7.12  0.0919  7.46  0.1486  6.11
Family size  -0.2939  -28.65  -0.2958  -28.64  -0.2956  -28.86  -0.2952  -28.84  -0.2954  -25.57  -0.2965  -25.55  -0.2970  -25.76
Familysizesquared  0.0104  23.48  0.0105  23.40  0.0105  23.76  0.0105  23.82  0.0101  20.29  0.0102  20.20  0.0102  20.71
Hlead  of household  is female  0.0922  7.17  0.0914  7.08  0.0933  7.26  0.0920  7.15  0.1160  7.59  0.1151  7.52  0.1155  7.57
Ageofheadofhousehold  0.0122  8.00  0.0119  7.85  0.0121  7.98  0.0121  7.97  0.0109  6.56  0.0107  6.43  0.0109  6.56
Age  ofhead  ofhouselhold  squared*  00  -0.0001  -6.76 -0.0001  -6.56  -0.0001  -6.72  -0.0001  -6.71  -0.0001  -5.85  -0.0001  -5.69  -0.0001  -5.86
Avg. years  of education  of adult household  inembers  -0.0627  -13.09  -0.0639  -13.34  -0.0621  -11.49  -0.0605  -12.65  -0.0656  -11.71  -0.0665  -11.88  -0.0625  -11.13
Avg. years  ofeducation ofadult  household  members  0.0100  32.20  0.0101  32.59  0.0101  31.94  0.0100  32.29  0.0105  29.63  0.0106  29.89  0.0105  29.83
squared
No of children between  1-6  years  -0.0099  -1.09  -0.0096  -1.05  -0.0096  -1.05  -0.0097  -1.06  -0.0022  -0.20  -0.0024  -0.23  -0.0016  -0.15
No of children between  7-14 years  0.0384  4.33  0.0389  4.39  0.0382  4.31  0.0381  4.31  0.0311  3.05  0.0311  3.05  0.0309  3 03
Noofmaleadults(atleast  15years)  0.1005  11.00  0.0996  10.85  0.1074  10.43  0.1020  11.08  0.1326  12.39  0,1313  12.24  0.1335  12.47
No of female  adults (at least IS  years)  01047  10.86  0.1050  10.83  0.1087  10.22  0.1090  11.09  0.1183  10.75  0.1180  10.69  0.1215  10.97
[lead ofhousehold is single  00217  1.19  0.0211  1.15  0.0212  1.17  0.0209  1.15  -0.0046  -0.22  -0.0054  -0.26  -0.0057  -0.28
[lead of household  is widow(cr)  -0.1153  -8.86  -0.1170  -8.96  -0.1155  -8.88  -0.1143  -8.80  -0.1218  -7.74  -0.1234  -7.84  -0.1209  -7.71
Ilead ofhousehold is divorced  -0.1556  -6.43  -0.1575  -6.50  -0.1566  -6.49  -0.1563  -6.47  -0.1366  -4.74  -0.1383  -4.79  -0.1376  -4.78Dep.  variable:  Log  consumption  per person  Dep.  variable:  Log  income  per person
Model  (1)  Model  (1)  Model  (2)  Model  (2)  Model  (1)  Model  (1)  Model  (2)
OLS  IV  OLS  restricted  OLS  IV  restricted
Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat
Household  has  electricity  0.2578  27.01  0.2571  26.98  0.2581  27.11  0.25B1  27.10  0.2161  19.63  0.2154  19.57  0.2145  19.51
Social  capital index  -0.0043  -0.12  -0.0083  -0.23  0.0210  0.41  0.0190  0.48  0.0041  0.14  0.0018  0.06  0.0573  1.63
lnfTastructure  capital index  0.1384  4.70  0.1299  441  0.1201  2.76  0.1360  4.61  0.1413  4.91  0.1334  4.66  0.1371  4.77
Commercial  capital index  0.1041  3.33  0.1072  3.43  0.1210  2.86  0.1231  3.76  0.1159  4.14  0.1185  4.21  0.0997  3.17
Diversity of employment  0.0597  3.69  0.0509  3.75  0.0437  2.46  0.0406  2.31  -0.0618  -3.17  -0.0602  -3.08  -0.0853  -4.20
Shock  variables:
Labormarketshock:S(L)  -0.1190  -9.29  -0.0141  -0.25  0.1070  1.91  0.1238  2.49  -0.1657  -12.19  -0.0454  -0.84  0.1072  2.24
El Nirto shock: S(E)  -0.0502  -5.11  -0.0639  -2.71  -0.0481  -1.35  -0.0351  -1.32  -0.0756  -6.90  -0.0918  -3.72  -0.0930  -3.18
Joint lab. Market-EI Nito shock: S(LE)  -0.0924  -7.54  -0.0204  -0.84  0.0337  0.70  -0.1468  -11.96  -0.1056  -4.49
S(L)Avg.  years  of educationi  of adult  houschold  -0.0202  -4.31  -0.0215  -4.93  -0.0217  -4.70
members
S(L)*No of male  adults  (at least IS years)  -0.0167  -1.60  -0.0113  -1.19
S(L)*No of female  adults  (at least  15  years)  -0.0143  -1.33  -0.0147  -1.45  -0.0226  -2.01
S(L)'Diversity  of employment  0.0253  1.56  0.0263  1.63
S(L)*Member  of a cooperative  or NGO  -0.0411  -0.98
S(L)'Owns land  -0.0022  -0.05  -0.0957  -1.80
S(L)*Social capital index  0.0358  0.55
S(L)*lnfrastructure capital index  0.0359  0.57
S(.)'Commercial  capital index  -0.1382  -2.16  -0.1092  -2.54  -0.0767  -1.82
S(E)*Avg. years  of education  of adult household  0.0027  0.95
members
S(E)*No of male adults  (at least 15  years)  -0.0083  -1.17
S(E)*No of female  adults  (at least 15  years)  0.0015  0.19
S(E)'Diversity of employment  0.0257  2.34  0.0287  2.96  0.0408  3.78
S(E)*Member of a cooperative  or NGO  -0.1098  -3.91  -0.0877  -3.75
S(E)'Owns land  -0.0356  -1.49  -0.0395  -1.77  -0.0782  -2.93
S(E)*Social  capital index  -0.0855  -1.46  -0.0691  -1.58  -0.1034  -2.18
S(E)infrastructure capital  index  0.0077  0 15
S(E)*Commercial  capital index  0.0347  0.64  0.0620  1.62
S(LE)'Avg  years  of education  of adult household  -0.0108  -2.90  -0.0095  -3.53  -0.0184  -6.67
members
S(LE)*No of male adults  (at least 15  years)  -0.0087  -1.07
29Dep. variable: Log consumption per person  Dep. variable: Log income per person
Model (1)  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (2)  Model (1)  Model (1)  Model (2)
OLS  IV  OLS  restricted  OLS  IV  restricted
Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat
S(LE)*No  of fcmale  adults  (at  least  15  years)  -0.0150  -1.60  -0.0139  -1.67
S(LE)*Diversity  of  employment  0.0195  1.50  0.0259  2.28  0.0280  2.41
S(LE)*Member  of a  cooperative  or NGO  -0.0309  -0.91  0.0818  2.56
S(LE)*Owns  land  -0.0454  -1.56  -0.0473  -1.75  -0.0798  -2.43
S(LE)*Social  capital  index  0.0009  0.01  -0.0890  -2.18
S(LE)*Infrastructure  capital  index  0.0497  0.83
S(LE)*Commercial  capital  index  -0.1001  -1.49  -0.0669  -1.73
Nuimberofobservations  38710  38710  38710  38710  38585  38585  38585
Number  of estimated  parameters  233  233  263  249  233  233  263
R -square  0.5890  0.5869  0.5904  0.5902  0.5890  0.5869  0.5904
F test  F(14,3917)  = 0.65
Ptob  > F  0.83
Note: The t-statistics allow for design effects due to the stratification and clustering of the APIS sample.  The sample has 168 strata and 3378  primary sampling units.
Each of the regressions also allow for strata fixed effects and 32 provincial dummy variables to control for missing barangay data. The estimated income models
exclude 125 observations with negative reported incomes.
Source: Calculated from 1998  APIS data.
30Table 4: Impact of the crisis on consumption poverty and inequality
Poverty/inequality  measure  Actual  Counterfactual  Impact  Counterfactual
(all shocks  zero)  (%)  (without  L-  (without  E-  (without  LE-
shock)  shock)  shock)
Mean consumption  26482  27859  -4.9  26837  27004  26982
(per capita per year)  450  468  454  460  454
[25.8]  [37.9]  [36.3
Headcount index (%)  31.7  29.1  8.7  31.2  30.5  30.7
0.47  0.46  0.47  0.46  0.47
[17.0]  [46.5]  [36.5]
Poverty gap index (%)  9.43  8.47  11.3  9.32  8.91  9.10
0.20  0.19  0.20  0.19  0.20
[11.5]  [54.1]  (34.4]
Squared poverty gap index (%)  3.93  3.48  13.0  3.89  3.67  3.78
0.11  0.Io  0.11  0.11  0.11
[9.51  [57.01  (33.5]
Theil's T-index  0.513  0.512  0.1  0.513  0.513  0.511
0.057  0,056  0.057  0.058  0.056
Variance of logs  0.628  0.633  -0.9  0.635  0.624  0.631
0.011  0.011  0.011  0.011  0.0o
Generalized entropy measure (e=2)  2.02  1.97  2.4  1.99  2.05  1.98
0.68  0.67  0.67  0.71  0.66
Generalized entropy measure (e=3)  75.0  69.7  7.5  72.1  76.4  71.0
48.4  44.4  46.5  48.7  45.8
Note:  Figures  in italics  are the standard  errors  corrected  for sample  design  effect. The  figures  in square  brackets  give the relative  contribution  of the three
shocks  to the total  impact  (not calculated  for the inequality  measures  for which  these  contributions  are not additive.
Source:  Calculated  from 1998  APIS  data.
31Table 5: Impact of the crisis on income  poverty and inequality
Poverty/inequality  measure  Actual  Counterfactual  Impact  Counterfactual
(all shocks  zero)  (%)  (without  L-  (without  E-  (without  LE-
shock)  shock)  shock)
Mean consumption  26547  28437  -6.6  27010  27254  27268
(per capita per year)  527  556  531  548  531
124.51  [37.4]  [38.1]
Headcount index(%)  31.7  28.3  12.0  31.2  29.9  30.6
0.45  0.43  0.45  0.44  0 44
[14.6]  [53.5]  [31.9]
Poverty gap index(%)  11.1  9.5  16.0  10.9  10.2  10.6
0.22  0.20  0.22  0.21  0.21
[10.4]  [57.0]  [32.6]
Squared poverty gap index (%)  5.48  4.67  17.5  5.41  5.00  5.22
0.142  0.132  0.142  0.136  0.140
[8.5]  [59.6]  [31.9]
Theil's T-index  0.636  0.627  1.5  0.635  0.634  0.631
0.069  0.068  0.068  0.071  0.068
Variance of logs  0.785  0.779  0.8  0.795  0.770  0.789
0.015  0.014  0.015  0.014  0.015
Generalized entropy measure (e=2)  2.87  2.76  4.2  2.81  2.92  2.77
0.605  0.585  0.585  0.636  0.574
Generalized entropy measure (e=3)  68.8  63.8  7.8  65.5  71.8  63.9
22.9  21.5  21.8  24.4  21.2
Note: Figures  in italics are the standard  errors  corrected  for  sample design  effect. The  figures  in square  brackets  give the relative  contribution  of the three
shocks  to the total impact  (not calculated  for  the inequality  measures  for which these  contributions  are not  additive.
Source:  Calculated  from 1998  APIS  data.
32Figure 1: Some key macro indicators  in recent years,  by quarter
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33Figure 2: Change in the cumulative distribution  function due to the crisis
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37Table Al: Descriptive statistics of model variables (1998 APIS)
Model  Variables  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max.
At least one adult household member
- in agriculture, fisherv or forestry  0.441  0.497  0  1
- in mining or quarrying  0.007  0.084  0  1
- in manufacturing  0.152  0.359  0  1
- in electricity, gas or water  0.010  0.098  0  1
- in construction  0.107  0.309  0  1
- in wholesale or retail  0.243  0.429  0  1
- in transport, storage, communication  0.130  0.337  0  1
- in finance, real estate, business services  0.043  0.202  0  1
- in communal, social, personal services  0.303  0.460  0  1
Produces food for own consumption  0.455  0.498  0  1
Urban household  0.593  0.491  0  1
Member of a cooperative orNGO  0.147  0.281  0  1
Beneficiary of govemment assistance (extension  0.028  0.086  0  1
service/scholarship/housing/land reform)
Owns land  0.178  0.383  0  1
Family size  5.058  2.260  1  24
Family size squared  30.690  27.898  1  576
Head of household is female  0.162  0.369  0  1
Age of head of household  47.246  14.220  6  99
Age of head of household squared*00  2434.4  1460.4  36  9801
Avg. years of education of adult household members  8.063  3.172  0  17
Avg. years of education of adult household members squared  75.064  50.014  0  289
No of children between 1-6  years  0.762  0.973  0  7
No of children between 7-14  years  1.051  1.197  0  7
Noofmaleadults(atleast  15 years)  1.571  1.027  0  10
No of female adults (at least 15 years)  1.572  0.935  0  10
Head of household is single  0.038  0.192  0  1
Head of household is widow(er)  0.128  0.335  0  1
Head of household is divorced  0.015  0.123  0  1
Household has electricity  0.743  0.437  0  1
Social capital index  0.474  0.229  0  1
Infrastructure capital index  0.458  0.285  0  1
Commercial capital index  0.435  0.281  0  1
Diversity of employment  1.476  0.669  1  6
Shock variables:
Labor market shock: S(L)  0.081  0.273  0  1
El Nino shock: S(E)  0.391  0.488  0  1
Joint lab. Market-El Nino shock: S(LE)  0.176  0.381  0  1
Note: Number  of observations  = 38,710.
Source:  Calculated  from  1998 APIS data.
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